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ABSTRACT
Burnett, Luke A. M.S. C.S. , Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright State
University, 2020. Extracting Information From Subroutines using Static Analysis Semantics.
Understanding how a system component can interact with other services can take an
immeasurable amount of time. Reverse engineering embedded and large systems can rely
on understanding how components interact with one another. This process is time consum-
ing and can sometimes be generalized through certain behavior.We will be explaining two
such complicated systems and highlighting similarities between them. We will show that
through static analysis you can capture compiler behavior and apply it to the understanding
of a function, reducing the total time required to understand a component of whichever
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Introduction
Trusted computing has been a focus of processor designers in order to mitigate post
exploitation vectors for manipulating data that should be considered sensitive[3][4]. Com-
puting services will continue to move away from being hosted inside businesses as the
usage of cloud computing technology grows in popularity. One study predicts that as much
as 94 percent of workloads will be processed in the cloud, with 73 percent being accessible
by public cloud instances[5]. over 3 billion mobile subscriptions exist globally, with each
continent continuing to grow in mobile network size[6]. The computing devices that touch
our lives have individual approaches to processing sensitive data.
When examining these interfaces from a security perspective, determining how pri-
vate information is transfered between parts of a system is integral for deciding how mind-
ful the engineers were when designing these processors. We will examine two separate,
but popular, architectures and their respective trust interfaces: Intel Software Guard Exten-
sions(SGX), and Arm TrustZone. The purpose of these sections are to give examples of
systems that are complex in nature.
Afterwards, we will discuss generalizing semantics of subroutines to extract informa-
tion. While not in the context of the previously discussed sections, the semantic discussion
would ideally aid someone examining these technologies. The background of both Trust-




Applications and internet software is increasingly growing with the rise of internet of
things devices entering the market. With every new device on the internet there are more
opportunities for invasions of privacy[7], malicious actors commandeering your devices[8],
or manufacturers making your device prematurely obsolete[9][10]. Understanding how
these devices work is important for any number of reasons, but this process can be time
consuming.
Additionally, desktop applications are becoming more increasingly connected with
the addition of Trusted Platform Modules(TPM)[11]. This TPM hosts an external proces-
sor that can be used to encrypt and decrypt data. This discrete processor can be used to
protect your computer, or be used by a malicious actor to send a encrypted malware that is
theoretically impossible to examine[12].
Understanding a new code base can be difficult, even when source code is present.
This thesis aims to provide a guided introduction to automated static analysis techniques
and how to apply them to your understanding of a foreign interface. This thesis will also
show how automated semantic understanding of a binary can assist in your understanding
of a binary.
1.2 Goals
During the development of this thesis we have developed a system to work with NSA’s
Software Reverse Engineering suite, Ghidra[13]. This system is able to integrate semantics
that are understood by reverse engineers as they work through understanding executables
from any processor supported by Ghidra. This framework operates on P-Code[14], the
intermediate representation that gets lifted from the disassembly process of a subroutine
within a binary.
The framework is designed to be easily extendable and have an API for resolving
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the estimated values of variables at a given point in time using a limited value-set analysis
technique[15]. The framework provides the ability to access basic blocks and automatically
be called back with a p-code operation to be handled, allowing for concurrent analysis to
hypothetically be run in conjunction with one another.
This current implementation aims to resolve type sizes and potential subtypes based
on how structure members are used within a set of functions. This problem seemed to be
the easiest to show such a framework could be worthwhile, in the author’s opinion. Time
taken to resolve ”easily shown” dependencies can be tedious and repetitive, so reducing the
amount of time spent on this task can be important. This framework also aims to show that
semantic extraction based on intermediate representation is as valid as native instructions
for extracting semantic facts from lifted disassembly.
1.3 Related Work
Some authors have tried to integrate semantic understanding to their static workflow.
In 2012 Rolf Rolles gave a keynote[16] in which he compiled several different works to
describe semantic understanding within a binary, and how semantic understanding of a
binary triumphs over simply syntatic understanding of a binary when certain goals are
desired. This proposal explores deobfuscation of x86 binaries with the understanding of a
specific type of anti-debugging technique. This approach utilizes IDA1 and the Hex-Rays
decompiler addon in order to retrieve the intermediate representation of a binary instead
of parsing the x86 syntax. Unfortunately this type of representation, as far as the author
of this thesis knows, is available for the supported Hex-Rays platforms. This number of
platforms is much smaller than the number of supported platforms for Ghidra.
Edward J. Schwartz et al[17]. discuss a semantic based approach(called OOAnalyzer)
for discovering objects and their inheritance relationships within a binary. Using a frame-
work for deriving facts about a binary, observed semantics of a binary are used to uncover
1https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/
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type relationships in portable executable binaries, a common executable format for Mi-
crosoft Windows. OOAnalyzer searches for common patterns used by C++ compiled bina-
ries, like the explicit return of the first parameter passed to a function, usage of the this
object as if it were an object, virtual function tables. This approach is limited to the specific
types of binaries that can be analyzed by the ROSE compiler infrastructure[17].
Blazytko, Contag, and Aschermann[18] wrote about using semantics to generally de-
obfuscate and derive the behavior of code that has been purposely obscured. This technique
relies on using the input and output behavior of code they want to synthesize. With this,
synthesis is then applied to a search algorithm to determine behavior of the system when it
is not purposely obfuscated. This technique relies on instrumenting the binary in order to
obtain an execution trace. This technique is great for understanding obfuscation as a black
box but can fail if the technique used to hide data relies on side effects or is computationally
expensive.
In 2014, Andrew Ruef introduced software[19] that specifically uses IDA to lift se-
mantics from defined instruction sets (ARM, x86/x86 64) to VEX, an intermediate rep-
resentation used by popular software Valgrind[20]. This tool has a dependence on pre-
condition of knowing the calling convention of whatever architecture you are targeting for
analysis. This technique also relies on VEX, which can normally be obtained through
dynamic analysis using tools like Valgrind or through concolic analysis using angr[21].
1.4 Organization
The first chapter of this thesis describes the problem, desired outcomes as a result of
this work, approaches using dynamic analysis, and why static analysis can be preferred
over dynamic analysis. The second chapter has a background section on interfaces that are
complex which would be ideal for static analysis but would be poor targets for dynamic
analysis. The third chapter describes vocabulary and defines information used in our work.
The fourth chapter describes our approach to solving this problem. The fifth chapter eval-
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uates our approach on effectiveness. The sixth chapter states conclusions and postulates
how this approach could be applied to other problems in this space.
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Historical Information
2.1 Intel History and Overview
Intel processors, upon starting, cause the processor to be placed in real mode if one of
the later described modes isn’t entered before the first long(or far) jump. A long/far jump
is an instruction using both a segment register and an offset with a jmp instruction[22].
Real mode addressing involves using a segment register along with an offset for accessing
resources[23]. The formula for determining the accessed memory when using the segment
register and offset is:
memory = (registersegment ∗ 16) + offset
Although this equation suggests that we have only 220 bytes available to us, we have slightly
more due to the way that setting certain registers work. We can access even more memory
addresses by utilizing manufacturer features and setting the A20 address line for more fea-
ture rich booting systems, eventually leading to accessing the rest of the address space and
eventual entry into protected mode. Real mode is responsible for bootstrapping hardware
(excluding enclaves), like high speed memory devices (random access memory), graphics
controllers, networking interfaces, and other system modes that handle management in-
terrupts.1 After configuring system hardware for usage the processor will be placed into
protected mode if the processor supports 32 bit mode or long mode if it supports 64 bit
mode.
1Intel specifically mentions in [23] that this type of initialization is somewhat dependant on the processor.
This makes sense and is, therefore, difficult to generalize.
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Protected mode and long mode allow for us to utilize functionality that we are accus-
tomed to in more accommodating tasks like user space application development. These
modes allow for us to access the respective address spaces like virtual memory. Interest-
ingly, the Intel processor starts execution at the highest mebibyte of memory[23].2 This
is to accommodate systems that have smaller amounts of RAM without needing to under-
stand how much RAM is installed in the system. Having the boot firmware located in the
highest mebibyte of memory allows for more efficient management of physical memory,
due to the chunks of memory not being split preemptively due to system constraints placed
by the manufacturers.
Virtual memory allows systems to effectively overlay an address space for separate
programs in an operating system. Each process has a set of entries that keep track of
which physical pages that process has access to. This allows for the pages of memory to
be written back to disk in the instances where a process isn’t scheduled to run as often, or
saving memory when a large set of processes happen to use some of the same underlying
pages. For example, processes share the same copy of the C shared library. Page tables
aren’t visible to the process and is typically presented with a flat memory model. Virtual
memory became a hardware feature of Intel processors in 1985[24].
An additional feature of paged memory allow for specific regions of the address space
to have permissions associated with the purpose of the page. Having granular permissions
for a region of memory allow for operating systems to hinder the utilization of weird ma-
chines3 within your system[25].
As systems became more complicated, it was increasingly important to define bound-
aries for system responsibility. Some components of a computing system are more privi-
leged than others, meaning they aren’t as restricted in modifying the system. More privi-
leged segments traditionally have an easier time with hiding and abstracting details away
2See the Power-Up (Reset Vector)Handling section for this particular tidbit.
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weird machine
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Figure 2.1: Intel Privilege Rings[1].
from less privileged segments of the Intel system. Intel processors refer to privilege seg-
ments as rings2.1. Intel’s ring system are based on the idea of hierarchical protection
domains[26]. People are most familiar with are ring 3 and ring 0, the application and ker-
nel space respectively. In general, rings that are numerically lower than another ring in
comparison can leverage its privilege to perform stealthy actions that would be considered
malicious if the behavior is controlled in the right manner.
This still isn’t the entire picture. If you have ever had a processor overheat or some
other obscure problem with your home computer, you may have encountered an event
that was not handled by the operating system. Just as interrupt events are handled by
different portions of your operating system (or user application), events can generated by
your processor that are handled inside of System Management Mode(SMM)[27]. This mode
of operation cannot be masked by the operating system and handling of the interrupt is
transparent to the other portions of the system that the interrupt even occurred[28]. SMM
can manipulate hardware freely and examine contents of the processor modes above it.
SMM is commonly referred to as Ring -2.
SMM Isn’t enabled at boot-time like one would expect. SMM has its own portion of
RAM (SMRAM), as well as a reserved address space for accomplishing its goals. SMM is
enabled after the system BIOS has finished initializing just enough of the system to service
management interrupts. A management interrupt can stay pending until it is acknowledged
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by the management interface[28].
Below the System Management Mode is the Intel Management Engine (ME). The ME
runs on a separate microprocessor[29] that is largely responsible for performing manage-
ment tasks. The firmware running on this microprocessor is proprietary and obfuscated to
hide it from outside analysis. The ME is running while the processor has access to power,
meaning that you can access certain functionalities of the computer even while the main is
in an ”off” state. Since the ME isn’t a state of processor execution but is necessary for a
complete view of the processor with regard to privileged attack surfaces in Intel hardware,
ME is addressed briefly.
Each privilege level is designed with a specific purpose in mind. By abstracting each
level above the lowest level, you can implement for granular hardware capabilities while
supporting the higher layers with appropriate abstractions that avoid regression. Each layer
has a job that it needs to complete and in some instances it can be difficult to achieve
transparency effectively when working with state outside of a processor. For example, un-
derstanding that hardware not located inside of the processor itself can have state that is
modified by a layer/ring before the appropriate/dispatched service gets to view that hard-
ware’s interrupt. If a service needs to examine information, it is free to view and manipulate
the data of the protection rings above it. This presents problems with hosting your propri-
etary or private data in cloud computing environments. Having your data and infrastructure
hosted at a remote location can be quite beneficial for companies that cannot afford (or
have the desire to) build infrastructure to host their own computing resources.
As computing resources became cheaper to produce, the need to host infrastructure
outside of businesses also came to a head. The need to scale up with business while reduc-
ing staffing costs, along with the cost of high speed internet getting cheaper, necessitated
the rise of large servers emulating hosts for business needs. These pieces of functionality
are supported by both software and hardware. Hardware allows for the operating systems
that businesses interface with to be unmodified, effectively creating ring -1[30]. The soft-
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ware that runs in ring -1 manages resources between the different operating systems, also
known as guests, letting one computer transparently run several operating systems.
Since individuals are running their proprietary applications inside another person’s
computer there is a demonstrated need to hide some things from the underlying layers of
your system. Imagine if the cloud hosting provider you are utilizing to process sensitive
customer data was able to silently skim data for its own nefarious deeds. One way to ensure
that our data is unable to be seen from more privileged modes of execution on the processor
is to utilize hardware functionality specifically designed to restrict data from being seen
from outside the correct context.
Intel’s SGX is designed to reduce the attack surface within an application. Privacy
inside a binaries address space is achieved throuh dedicated hardware that is bundled with
processors that support SGX[31]. Instead of having the weakness of being at a lower
execution level than the kernel, hypervisor, or management software, SGX allows for code
inside of an untrusted environment to at least have some level of accountability, as long as
you implicitly trust Intel to implement the primitives. The area in which private details are
stored is called an enclave. The technology that performs trusted actions on behalf of the
manufacturer is called trusted execution technology[32].
Intel’s SGX sits alongside ring 3, at the same level as the application layer[33]. This
is a peculiar choice, but effectively follows the separation of privileges between layers and
avoids getting more privilege than it would need. SGX is not initialized at system runtime,
and is instead created when a service running on the processor requests an enclave. The
initial state of the enclave is loaded from storage[33]. Afterwards, a program may place
whatever it likes inside the enclave, code or data, and then tell the enclave to perform
actions on the program’s behalf.
The astute reader may be wondering how someone could trust the execution state of
the enclave if it is loaded on demand from storage. The program that is fetched from
memory may be corrupted or tainted from a malicious actor. Intel allows whomever is
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communicating with the enclave to have the secure processor provide a checksum of sorts
to prove that the enclave is in a state that makes sense. This is referred to as an attesta-
tion key[34]. The attestation key is provided by Intel and is the designated standard for
determining if your enclave is in a predefined, trusted state.
2.2 ARM History and Overview
ARM Processors start in a trusted mode, which is referred to as the secure world[35].
In order to fully explain the ARM boot model, privilege explanation will need to happen
first. For the purpose of this thesis, I will address ARM processors that inherently support
the trusted mode of execution. (TrustZone) ARM works on the concept of exception lev-
els. There are four defined exception levels, each level having its own purpose within the
context of the system itself.
Before discussing the ARM boot process, understanding the privilege structure is im-
portant. ARM processors have two security states, secure and non-secure. Each exception
level can operate in a secure or insecure context in the newest version of the ARM specifi-
cation, while in older ARMv8.3 chips there is no secure exception level 2[36]. The ARM
processor can only switch from a non-secure to secure (or vise versa) state from exception
level 3, whose responsibilities will be explained later[37]. Exception levels can only be
advanced one at a time and must be passed directly above or below the current state of
execution. ARM processors start in a privileged mode, similar to Intel processors.
The secure monitor is the gateway between the secure and insecure worlds in ARM
processors[37]. This interface is similar to the system procedure call in operating systems,
where an unprivileged process wants to communicate with a privileged process in order to
have something done on the unprivileged process’s behalf. This is all done at exception
level 3(EL3), or if AArch32 EL1. This is the highest privilege level and allows the proces-
sor to place itself into a secure mode. The monitor code is largely vendor implemented and
can vary depending on which manufacturer wrote the firmware for your processor.
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Figure 2.2: ARM Exception Levels[2]
After the secure monitor is installed at boot, it will set up other exception level states.
The only mandatory exception levels are exception levels 0 and 1, the application and kernel
space respectively. In a system where these are the only exception levels initialized, the
highest exception level is responsible for hardware management[38]. The secure monitor
will initialize the state for exception levels 1 (and 2 if it will be utilized) in the non-secure
world. After allowing the secure kernel at exception level 1 to initialize its own state, the
secure monitor will give execution to the highest non-secure world component. This may
be a hypervisor (exception level 2) or a kernel (exception level 1).
As stated before, ARM processors are segregated by exception level. In ARM par-
lance, exception level 0 is similar to ring 3. Figure ARM Exception Levels[2] shows the
exception levels available to ARMv8 processors. When you take into consideration that
there is a separate mode for secure applications, the secure exception level 0 is used for
trusted applications that can be specified for specific use and purpose for the system. This
could include any level of separation within the system, like a filesystem wrapper or the
ability to have some cryptographic function executed in the secure world.
The secure operating mode of the processor allows for trust to be segregated by applet.
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Each trusted action has its own application space similar to a binary running on your box.
Applications like fingerprint reading, retrieving credit card data from secure memory, and
NFC payments[39] can all be separate processes inside of your trusted application layer.
The only difficulty here is that each application has to communicate through a well de-
fined communication protocol defined by ARM. Using the exception raising programming
interface defined by ARM, you can build your own functionality.
For example, say that a process running at exception level 0 wants to access some im-
portant data that is protected by TrustZone. That process will need to raise an exception that
can either be handled at that same exception level or raised. Raising the exception through
each utilized running exception level allows the call to reach the secure monitor, and the
monitor will decide if it wants to transfer your data to the secure world and propagate your
request to the proper trusted applet.
One peculiar fact to be observed about processes running in the secure processor state
is that each process is able to read (or write) any portion of the processor[40]. This is an
odd security boundary to allow breached, as a hijacked trusted application can completely
rewrite how each portion of the secure world. There was a mitigation developed and im-
plemented in specifications for ARM processors. Until ARMv8.4, there was no secure
exception level 2. By introducing a secure exception level 2, each application located in
the secure space can receive its own segregated program space, further reducing the attack
surface introduced by having secure layers be implicitly trusted. This allows for individ-
ual processors to implement sandbox-like features for each applet, mitigating the ability to
modify contents within other secure applet spaces.
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Example Systems
As discussed, both Intel and ARM processors have interfaces for storing and process-
ing information inside of an area that is purportedly secure. These interfaces rely on vendor
implementations and can be large enough to include mistakes. We can’t naturally assume
that programs which we trust can be implicitly trusted. Security researchers should spend
the time to understand these interfaces. This section will identify how Intel SGX and ARM
TrustZone are communicated with on at an assembly instruction level. This section will
also try to further explain the platform differences.
Taking time to examine these interfaces can be time consuming, as often the inter-
face for acquiring information from parts of the system can be either proprietary or poorly
documented. Reverse engineering sections of a binary for one platform may not be useful
for generalizing information across several platforms. This can be arduous and produces
diminished results. This section serves to describe the purpose of common interfaces and
utilizing these similarities to discover how vendor implemented APIs can be discovered
using automated program analysis techniques.
Luckily, for researchers looking to quickly identify which services on their machines
may or may not be utilizing these processor features, by disassembling executables on the
system we can narrow down the surface we need to examine. By looking for these markers,
we can examine what data may be flowing in and out of the secure processor zones. First,
we must discuss in greater detail the process for utilizing each secure enhancement before
discussing how one would automatically characterize APIs.
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3.1 Applications and SGX
One of SGX’s primary goals includes establishing trusted computing resources within
a remote, untrusted, environment. SGX operates at the same ring of privilege as applica-
tions launched by unprivileged users. Remote trust is established in a few ways. When first
entering and utilizing a piece of trusted hardware, you must trust the manufacturer of that
hardware.
When initializing an enclave, the processor will create a memory region called the
Processor Reserved Memory (PRM)[41]. PRM is initialized and reserved early within
the boot process of the processor and is yielded to the processor. Any attempt to modify
or read this memory range causes a protection fault. Inside the PRMs data region is the
Enclave Page Cache (EPC)[41], which holds a mapping of physical memory pages mapped
to enclave-only access. The PRM is small in size and is large enough to hold a structure
similar to traditional page tables for secure processes so you can dynamically release and
retrieve resources for enclave purposes. Each controlled page of memory is encrypted and
kept track of using the Memory Encryption Engine(MEE)[42]. The MEE subverts normal
memory access operations by translating memory accesses to the pages corresponding to
secure enclaves when requested from the correct context.
Each secure enclave operates similar to a process within the context of an operating
system, with a few exceptions with regard to book keeping. An enclave has its own set
of saved registers for securely saving and restoring state before entering and exiting the
enclave area. Enclaves support multithreading, which means that enclave threads have their
own version of thread local storage, called the thread control structure(TCS)[43]. Enclaves
have metadata associated with the individual enclave instance, like a cryptographic hash
representing the contained data and the total size of said data area. Enclaves must also
implement their own internal memory management operations (like a heap manager).
An application can load whatever program it likes into memory one page at a time.
Adding a page of memory will change the metadata of the enclave, referred to as its mea-
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sure[44] in Intel nomenclature. After all pages necessary for an enclave to function are
added to the secure address space, the enclave is finalized. Before entering the enclave,
the processor will save the state of the current process and then turn off precise event based
sampling[45], which would give someone unnecessary insight into the enclave. This allows
the enclave to appear as a single instruction to performance monitoring tools. If an inter-
rupt is issued to the process while the enclave is executing, the enclave will exit and save its
context related to the TCS[45]. This context will be populated with routines that properly
handle saving the state of the enclave as well as the structure used to resume execution of
the enclave. Enclaves may be saved to disk by performing an action called sealing[46].
Sealing ensures that data integrity of the enclave is kept. when communicating with a re-
mote enclave, the process for determining if the state of the enclave is pristine is referred
to as attestation.
For all intents and purposes, attestation is also referred to as remote attestation[47],
as some key components rely on communicating with Intel in order to ensure the integrity
of the enclave. SGX’s attestation process is based off of a process called direct anony-
mous attestation[48], which tries to ensure that the identity of the owner of the platform
is preserved while still being able to prove the authenticity of the underlying hardware.
This protocol is a group scheme and allows for trusted third parties to authenticate plat-
forms without any knowledge of who the platform may be owned by. The protocol for
attestation is not necessarily important for understanding the interfaces utilized by system
implementors and won’t be covered in excruciating detail.
After the remote party communicates with the application endpoint, the application
will speak with the quoting enclave. The quoting enclave will take some information from
the enclave that is being attested, as well as a public key from the person requesting the at-
testation of the enclave being verified. This information is wrapped up inside of a structure
called the REPORT structure, allowing for verification to occur[49]. When the quoting en-
clave receives the REPORT, the quoting enclave will sign said REPORT with its Enhanced
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Privacy ID(EPID) key, turning the REPORT into a QUOTE. The QUOTE is then sent back
to the requesting application and then finally sent off to the Intel Attestation Service, which
is the only service that can validate EPID keys from quoting enclaves[34].
When an application is using an enclave to protect its memory, there are several ways
to interact with the trusted portion of the processor. An enclave can share memory with the
calling process in order to perform actions with protected data, referred to as an enclave
call, or ECall[50]. ECalls implicitly enter the enclave and allow it to execute. As the
enclave is executing it may need to call untrusted functions outside the enclave, which are
referred to as outside calls, or OCalls[50].
Enclaves are built with the idea of abstracting responsibility for enclave services to
the same trusted code base that would be used to bootstrap trust on the processor. Intel
provides a sample base set of services that should be used to provision enclaves and manage
your trusted code within the system. Intel provides a driver that correctly communicated
with the trusted hardware, some drivers/shared object files that help your program utilize
well defined interfaces, operating system services that can be used to communicate with
enclaves, and some example ”service” enclaves that perform additional duties outlined in
the Intel manual and briefly here. Collectively, these are referred to as the Architectural
Enclaves(AE)[51].
One of Intel’s provided enclaves, the Launch Enclave(LE), helps generate launch to-
kens for enclaves. This token will allow different enclaves to execute and can help enforce
policies for the type of enclaves that are launched or generating security info for the enclave
as it runs[52]. The LE has a list of policies kept by Intel for other Architectural Enclave
permissions.
The Provisioning Enclave (PE) participates in provisioning the EPID key of an enclave
container, as well as managing attestation of a machine. It will encrypt attestation keys for
other enclaves before they are sent out to a separate entity requiring that an enclave prove
that they are trustworthy[52]. This enclave works closely with the Provisioning Certificate
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Enclave (PcE) in order to get the processor certificate[53]. This certificate can only be
retrieved from this enclave.
Intel’s Quoting Enclave (QE) responsibly retrieves the signed attestation key and then
verifies that the key is legitimate. The QE will then produce a structure that can be remotely
verified by a party wishing to ensure that the integrity of the system is present[54]. The re-
port produced by this enclave can be verified with Intel’s servers and determine if the client
certificate stored inside the processor is revoked or not, in order to provide a mechanism
for replacing compromised or insecure certificates[55].
3.2 Areas of Interest for Intel SGX
From a reverse engineering standpoint, understanding what data is manipulated by a
proprietary enclave implemented by a vendor is interesting. Understanding which instruc-
tions utilized by the processor handle data that we are interested in can help us identify
the starting point for identifying information to provide context to how a program operates.
This section will outline processor instructions and their purpose in the context of an Intel
enclave.
When an application is setting up an enclave, they will need to add pages to the enclave
page cache in order to protect their data. This is accomplished by issuing an EADD instruc-
tion. This instruction will add a page to the EPC associated with a particular enclave[56].
An application may also want to evict a page from the EPC as it may not be needed
or it may also want to obfuscate what is located inside the enclave by confusing someone
who is disassembling their application. This instruction’s mnemonic is EREMOVE[57].
More importantly, a page may be ”blocked”. This would cause a page fault whenever
that particular page is accessed in the future, even by the owning enclave. Pages that are
blocked are marked for eviction from the enclave. In order for a page to be removed
from the EPC it must be prepared for removal (by blocking it) and then have no translation
lookaside buffers(TLB) pointing to the page. This instruction’s mnemonic is EBLOCK[58].
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There is an accompanying instruction to load a page and simultaneously be blocked, whose
mnemonic is ELDB. There are instructions for explicitly loading a page as unblocked as
well, with the mnemonic ELDU[58].
By comprehending the usage of an instruction we should be able to construct some
useful state that is kept track of by the client utilizing the enclave functionality in the same
manner that ARM’s TrustZone instructions will present a similar state outline. This state
will be useful for recovering type information about the API we may be trying to discover.
3.3 Applications and TrustZone
Arm’s TrustZone technology allow for system integrators to choose exactly what they
may need in order to protect their intellectual property. Arm provides an implementation
specification for system designers and the companies designing the system-on-a-chip can
fabricate the processor in a manner that they see fits. With this in mind, system designers
can add their own modifications to the processor, with regard to hardware or software, as
long as the processor follows the specification outlined by Arm. This means that adding
pertinent details with regard to implementation can be difficult as they may vary between
manufacturers. This section will outline more specifically how the processor utilizes adver-
tised trust functionality, highlighting an open source implementation of the secure world
processor. This particular open source TrustZone implementation utilizes the Linux kernel.
There is an ARM for Windows implementation, but this will be outside the scope of this
thesis.
ARM processor’s trusted computing implementation has the ability to communicate
and transfer information to the secure portion of the processor (the secure world). Since the
secure world essentially mirrors the insecure world, propagating information into the secure
portion of the processor involves having that data handled at each privilege(exception)
level. In the Intel enclave’s, the secure portion of the processor is isolated from the rest
of the processor and ensures that data inside of the enclave cannot manipulated/viewed by
19
portions of the processor that may be privileged. ARM TrustZone does not enforce this
strict separation[40], but as a result will need to transmit the data between the different
insecure layers in order to reach the secure monitor.
When an application wants to utilize the trusted portion of a processor, this is re-
ferred to as ”taking an exception”. As the processor handles a privileged exception[59],
the only options that exception level has are to handle the exception or raise the value[60].
When raising exception levels, the ARM processor has a specific register that saves the
return address for the level that raised the exception in a dedicated register, the exception
link register(Just like how the regular link register is used to save the return address for a
subroutine)[61]. An exception can be taken from any exception level, but you can never
take an exception to EL0[62].
According to Arm’s ARM specification, insecure EL0 does not take exceptions[60].
The job of taking an exception is left to EL1 (and if implemented, EL2) and properly
delegated to EL3, known as the secure monitor. This equates to communicating some piece
of information to a special device file from your user application. Within the Linux POSIX
layer is a special type of file that can be accessed and used in order to achieve our goal of
transmitting information from a user owned process to the kernel[63]. Implementing the
layer from EL0 to EL1 as a kernel driver which creates a device file allows for the kernel
to be allowed to be implemented as a proprietary interface without directly interfering with
how the kernel normally handles files or devices that are populated within the filesystem.
3.4 Areas of Interest for TrustZone
When attempting to call a function in a higher exception level, an instruction will be
called with the proper target exception level. The Supervisor Call (SVC) instruction targets
EL1[64]. The Hypervisor Call targets EL2[65]. The Secure Monitor Call targets EL3[66].
These instructions cause the processor to go to the processor’s exception vector and then
enter the software interrupt state. This state has access to the same registers that the caller
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uses to make these instruction calls. Implementation of the ARM system determines how
the arguments for this interface are extracted, by typically they are extracted from registers
as the interrupts have access to the same registers that the caller can manipulate before
issuing the interrupt. This adds an extra challenge to determining the API usage, as we
need to understand the calling convention of the target API.
Apart from the call itself, the system implements the API target and how each of the
exception raising instructions works with the system. Understanding how these system
calls are implemented is paramount. Just observing the arguments to the instruction itself,
a single immediate value is used for each instruction. This makes it very attractive for
system designers to implement handling each of the privileged instructions as a C switch
statement, after extracting extra arguments from the registers passed by the caller. This is




Machine language and the underlying processor are tied together by semantic under-
standings of how to best translate high level programming constructs into assembly instruc-
tions that are most efficient for that platform. Understanding how a subroutine translates
to a higher level function’s constructs can be time consuming. Methodology exists to at-
tempt automatically translating machine language to a language that most individuals are
comfortable with reading. This process is called decompilation. This will not be the focus
of this section, but many of the techniques discussed are suitable for decompilers.
All the techniques discussed are forms of static anaylsis. This refers to the fact that
no portion of the code that is analyzed actually is ran, but only examined and determined
to have certain qualities. First we will discuss some terminology and then we will discuss
methodology for determining how the trusted interfaces can be examined to determine what
you are able to pass to the trusted portions of the processors. This section will also intro-
duce terminology that can be used to discuss how compilers construct subroutines and the
terminology for discussing different techniques that are used throughout the compilation
process, and what that may mean for the function we are looking at.
4.1 Disassembly Terminology
When examining a binary there are a few ways for someone to determine the function-
ality and purpose. This section will focus exclusively on executable blobs and vocabulary
used to discuss the purpose of a given subroutine within a binary. There will not be a focus
on executable binary formats, aside from discussing how they may aide us in uncovering
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information about the binary’s purpose and how it may be used as part of the larger system.
4.1.1 Dominators
The dominator of a graph is important to understand from an analytical standpoint.
A node A inside a graph is dominated by node B if every directed edge of the graph from
the entry point to A goes through node B[67]. Understanding how a node inside of a
graph dominates another node is important for comprehending something called single
static assignment[68] and how it can help us estimate the value of a register at any given
point in time. Another term to be familiar with is the immediate dominator[69], which is
the ”closest” dominator to note A. That is to say, node B is an immediate dominator of node
A if no dominators exist between A and B.
4.1.2 Function Prologue
Typically, when a a subroutine is entered, there is some agreement between the caller
and the callee that some set of registers that are used are saved and some will be modified.
This agreement is discussed in the form of a calling convention. Some architectures will
have a fairly common calling convention, while other binaries that they interface with use a
separate calling convention. These differences are important for determining functionality.
Due to the nature of preserving registers, the callee will sometimes choose to place
the registers it needs to save on the stack before performing any functionality that is en-
capsulated by the subroutine. This can be helpful for determining what type of code is
being dealt with. For example, when looking at code that was written in C++ typically the
”this” object will be saved at some point before calling some subroutine, if that subroutine
happens to be a member of the object’s class.
4.1.3 Basic Blocks
One of the most common units when looking at a disassembled function in an analyt-
ical manner is the basic block. A basic block is a series of instructions that have a single
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entry point and a single exit point. The entry and exit may have several target destinations
but the important property provided by the basic block is that the instructions are executed
together. Basic blocks may include subroutine calls.
Combining basic blocks together with control flow instructions can create a graph
representation for a subroutine that can be used to describe and understand the behavior of
a function without the source code. It isn’t necessary to convert functions into this form
if you are personally reading the disassembly, but having the disassembly separated into
basic blocks can be exceedingly useful from a static analysis standpoint.
4.2 Static Single Assignment Form
Static single assignment form(SSA) provides a more mathematical representation to
a disassembled subroutine. When working with most high level languages (like C, C++,
etc) you can declare the existence of a variable and assign several values while it is in the
correct scope. With SSA, a variable is given a single value for the entirety of its lifetime
and cannot be given any other values[68]. When referring to a specific instance, we can
guarantee that this value is always the same given the circumstances it was derived. This
single assignment style is similar to proclaiming that the value is fact. When the value of a
register may contain several possible values, this is referred to as a phi value.
When looking at a variable in a programming context, assignment is a proposition to
say that an identifier is equal to some concrete value at assignment (or evaluation-time if
the language happens to be lazy). The value inside the context of SSA is always assigned
to a single instance of a given variable. The variable will only ever be one the value that
is assigned to it. Combining this with the concept of the basic block, we can infer what a
register’s value may be given the context of some basic block. If we can infer the value of
a register within a basic block we can use that information to more accurately understand
subroutines that we don’t yet have a type signature for.
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4.3 Value Set Analysis
Inside programming languages like C/C++, the use of memory for generic program-
ming constructs is almost mandatory if you would like to do anything useful. The fact that
memory is malleable within a system provides usefulness for engineered products but can
also cause grief if those systems are not accessible to inquiring minds. When translating
high level structures to architecture specific assembly you may find the use of a value to
offset your structure to get the member you are interested in. This is because the data you
are accessing conforms to the structures type, telling the compiler where the data you are
interested in is at.
With each subroutine, we have a set of values that we can analyze, hence the name of
this methodology. Using value set analysis(VSA) we can partially correlate functions that
may have not been related before by combining values grazed from subroutines and how
those values are used in context. This can give us an idea as to which subroutines work
with which objects in a binary that was written in C++.
4.4 Program Slicing
When determining what may have influenced a piece of data at the time of a subrou-
tine’s invocation it will be easier to infer the type of the argument if the irrelevant context
is removed. When approximating the value in argument registers you can calculate exactly
what a register is going to be by looking at the operations performed on the register. Re-
moving operations that are not necessary for inferring the value contained within a register
is referred to as a program slice. A program slice gives context to a value.
Normally, program slicing applies to source code. A slice is defined by a slicing crite-
rion, a combination of a statement and the variable you are slicing. Examining statements
that may be executed before the criterion statement and evaluating if that statement deter-
mines if the statement is in the program slice.
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4.5 Challenges with binary decidability
When looking at a binary, it can be impossible to know where execution may end
up inside of a binary. This thesis will not explore techniques for discovering subroutines
within a binary that are not directly accessed in some form. Binaries can have subroutines
that call subroutines through complex sets of instructions that are impossible to determine
the exact bounds. This causes problems with the approach we take in inferring type on
individual registers at call-time, where we can’t reasonably decide what would be inside a
register. This is a problem that is not explored by this thesis. Instead, we estimate what
may be in a register by noting when a register is derived from something that is an input to
a register.
4.6 Control Flow Graph
A control flow graph is a directed graph which represents the control flow through a
function. A path is a set of nodes and vertices connecting them. Execution of a control
flow graph involve starting at the root node, where the subroutine begins, and walking the
graph until the node you visit has no outgoing edges. Figure 4.1 shows a simple control
flow graph with no cycles. A cycle is a set of nodes and edges which, starting at any node
in the graph, you can visit each other node contained in the set an infinite number of times
by traveling along an edge in the aforementioned set.
4.7 P-Code
P-Code is described as, ”a register transfer language designed for reverse engineering
applications”[14]. This language is used as an intermediate representation to be consumed
by the decompiler, which allows for Ghidra to be processor agnostic with regards to its
ability to lift code from assembly to C syntax. Operating on p-code allows for the analysis
engine to (theoretically) support any architecture that can be lifted into p-code. This thesis
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Figure 4.1: A control flow graph for function within a Trustzone Driver
focuses solely on ARM.
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Methodology
Combining techniques and applying them to the disassembly of programs trusted to
perform communication we can estimate what the type of the argument may be in a some-
what accurate form without needing to actually execute the code within the binary. Ob-
serving a binary while executing can give great information for answering questions a re-
searcher may have about a binary. Unless you can exercise all possible execution states for
an unknown binary, you won’t receive complete information about a binary from simply
observing it while it is executing.
This section will outline a type inference scheme based on inferring type on its usage.
For example, data that is first dereferenced and then incremented may be an array of data or
a data structure, but is very unlikely to be any data that isn’t backed by memory. The code
written to test this hypothesis was written to work with Ghidra, the NSA’s software reverse
engineering framework. First the thesis will discuss constructing a control flow graph using
Ghidra’s API. Afterwards, the thesis will discuss how the control flow graph is iterated and
state is stored on an instruction by instruction basis.
Additionally there will be a discussion of patterns and limitations of this method.
There are two separate patterns tested in this thesis. One pattern aims to estimate size of
an input argument and the other pattern aims to correlate structure members to parameter
usage within subroutines.
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5.1 Control Flow Graph Construction
Ghidra does not provide an elegant way to get a workable control flow graph for
lifting as far as the author is aware. Ghidra offers a way to get individual code blocks at
an address, what it believes are the bounds of the block, the blocks successors, and the
blocks predecessors. Collecting all of this information we are able to translate this into two
separate graph interfaces provided by Ghidra in order to get different types of information.
The first, ghidra.util.graph.DirectedGraph, allows for us to access the
underling codeblock object easily. After getting the block information for the helper class
ghidra.program.model.block.SimpleBlockModel, we construct a digraph
composed of ghidra.util.graph.Vertex and ghidra.util.graph.Edge.
This graph will be used later for processing p-code in order for the function.
The second, ghidra.graph.jung.JungDirectedGraph allows for us to
efficiently search for paths between two blocks of a program, which will be important for
value-set analysis performed on the registers. This graph is composed of similarly named
classes ( ghidra.program.model.block.graph.CodeBlockVertex and
ghidra.program.model.block.graph.CodeBlockEdge) and used strictly for
its ability to provide us information on paths between two blocks. Constructing this graph
done after the construction of the ghidra.util.graph.DirectedGraph graph
class.
5.2 Control Flow Graph Parsing
After the construction of these objects, we design a high level analysis class, named
Analysis, to independently walk each p-code operation. This abstraction allows us to
combine several types of analysis, if we choose to. There are separate abstractions for the
act of walking the p-code representation of each block and actually performing the analysis
of how each p-code register is used.
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Figure 5.1: UML Diagram describing class layout for type analysis bookkeeping.
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Figure 5.2: Instruction for pushing registers onto stack with corresponding p-code.
Block Class Overview
We first begin by constructing a block representation class for each block of code
within the function with the assistance of the two directed graph classes. These blocks
contain: a reference to the analysis object, the block’s children, the block’s parents, if itself
is an entry node, the Jung node representation of itself, all paths in the graph that lead to
the block, the bounds for said block, and state for individual registers within the block.
See figure 5.1 for a UML representation of this object. All blocks are instantiated when
analysis of the function begins.
When processing p-code the state is saved to the Block object. Each Block keeps
a representation of the state for each register which is modified within its bounds. Each
IPState object is immutable after instantiation to give us the properties of SSA. If mul-
tiple states can be present within a block, the phi value is held within a PointState
object.
In order to understand what a state might be at some point we store each state as it
transitions between instructions. This must be done because each p-code operation may
access the same register several times within a single non-lifted instruction. Under the
current scheme used in this thesis, an operation like figure 5.2 would cause two states for
the stack pointer to be generated for a single instruction, which is clearly incorrect. To
correct for this, we keep track of the most recent transition made within an instruction and
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only commit the state after all p-code operations have been iterated.
Accessing state during analysis for a single instruction can be computationally com-
plex but offers the most information at the point in which it occurs. In order to access state,
we first search for modifications made for the block we are currently operating in. This
means, in the optimistic case, we find a state within the current block. In the pessimistic
case, we need to travel to the root node and traverse all paths between the target node and
the root node of the function. This operation is equivalent to a forward slice on a particular
register with respect to the path. This operation gives us a set of all possible values our
analysis thinks can be assumed by this register. Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between
PointState objects, IPState objects, and State objects.
5.3 Semantic Size Extraction
While processing p-code, each IPState is updated with what it may be according to
the operations performed on that register. As data is manipulated there are concrete values
that you can infer by adding a symbolic value to keep track of state at a later time. You can
also keep track of the history of a value and attempt to understand what several instructions
are doing with a single piece of data to accomplish a higher level concept.
For example, when a subroutine is entered there often is a prologue that will save
values. See figure 5.3 for an example. Some of these values may be inputs to the subroutine
and the address to resume execution at the subroutine’s conclusion. This operation directly
translates to manipulating data in the running program in order to obtain a result. This is
referred to as a stack frame[70]. In a way, stack frames are like anonymous structures that
are used by subroutines for bookkeeping. When values are stored in the stack frame, that
typically means they are inputs to a function and are required by the subroutine to perform
whatever high level operations were translated to the processor’s language.
These values, when retrieved, can reveal information about the inputs to the function
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Figure 5.3: Prologue for a function that takes one argument in ARM.
based on how its used. If a value is dereferenced and then offset and used as a function
pointer it may indicate that the argument is an object and had its virtual function table[71]
which has had a member function called.
By taking each operation and using it to try and derive semantics from the assembly I
try to estimate the size of structures and memory areas by assuming accesses are going to
be within bounds of the structure at least once. This can help infer the minimum size of a
structure used in a function.
5.4 Semantic Type Correlation
Any code that is written will have some amount of code reuse. It can be difficult as
a developer to understand when to turn a pattern into its own function. When trying to
understand how a complex function works it may help to see how that subroutine is used
in other functions. This relation can become even more important when several systems
use the same subroutine. Observing behavior that is oblique to whatever interface you are
trying to understand can be helpful.
If we are trying to determine what data types compose an argument to a subroutine
we can learn more about these functions if we look at sub-subroutines. If sections of other
the types we are interested in are used elsewhere, this can give us more data to correctly
determine the type of the sub-subroutine and better-estimate the callee’s types.
It can generally be said that the arguments to a subroutine have a concrete type when
written, but not necessarily when executed. That is to say, as long as the argument conforms
to the expected type of the subroutine, the subroutine can fulfill its contract. Consider figure
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1 void access_two(int foo[2])
2 {
3 printf("first foo: %d\n", foo[0]);
4 printf("second foo: %d\n", foo[1]);
5 }
Figure 5.4: a function that contractually takes an array of two integers.
1 void access_one_and_two(int* foo)
2 {
3 printf("first foo: %d\n", foo[0]);
4 access_two(&foo[1]);
5 }
Figure 5.5: a function that contractually takes an array of integers.
5.4 and what it means to the C compiler. When this subroutine is used, you can pass a
pointer to an array of three integers and the compiler emits no warnings.
Obviously, looking at the routine as a black box it would be apparent that the code
takes an array of two integers. Understanding code in figure 5.4 could help you understand
what the code in figure 5.5. Clearly code in figure 5.5 expects an array of 3 integers
despite not explicitly declaring the number of members it expects.
Utilizing subroutines that call other subroutines, along with the size estimation se-
mantic we have described, we can use function calls to infer relationships that we wouldn’t
have normally been able to infer. By using the restrictions placed on the callee’s datatype
we can more accurately recover the type of a subroutine and successfully correlate several
callee data types.
5.5 Limitations
There are a few drawbacks to be aware of when utilizing this form of automated
analysis. This section will outline limitations that I encountered when writing this proof of
concept tool using Ghidra. There are limitations presented by this approach and the tool
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Figure 5.6: Inference for a function produced by decompilation.
Figure 5.7: Inference for a function produced by disassembly.
that could further reduce the accuracy of results.
This approach makes an assumption about architecture specific semantics that may not
necessarily reflect how the high level implementation looks. For example, if the processor
demands 4 byte alignment the minimum size of an access to any memory location is at least
4 bytes. This can also be complicated further by odd sized structures, as some compilers
will make an assumption that the number of bytes accessible to any allocated memory will
be valid up to the minimum alignment size.
This further bleeds into architectural semantics when support for 64 bit registers is
not supported and a single argument can span several registers. This affects results of the
methodology and can be seen in the Testing and Results section.
Arguments to functions in Ghidra influence how the tool sees what arguments a func-
tion takes. We don’t try to infer the calling convention of a function and simply rely on
how Ghidra would interpret those arguments to a function. If Ghidra hasn’t been told what
arguments a function takes, it will try to infer what those arguments may be through dis-
Figure 5.8: Inferred return result for function in 5.6 and 5.7
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assembly and decompilation. 5.6 shows a function that has been decompiled and has a
reasonably looking signature. 5.7 shows the same function’s inferred type with a clear type
mismatch between number of arguments and output return type.
Furthermore, Ghidra can make some outright incorrect assumptions sometimes that
would be detrimental to fully trusting this tool to produce completely accurate results. 5.8
shows the end of a decompiled function that has the return from printf as the actual
return value. While functions that return other subroutine results are common, it is exceed-
ingly unlikely that you would check the return of printf in this case. This is made even
more difficult by the fact that the way this tool gets arguments to a function is by asking
Ghidra what it thinks the arguments are. When asking Ghidra for arguments it will get
what the disassembly states are the arguments, and not the decompilation.
Additionally, arguments to variadic functions do not give the arguments at the call site
but the minimum arguments to a function. This isn’t ideal for capturing usage throughout
a subroutine, as it requires us to understand the calling convention for an architecture and
break cross compatibility gained from analyzing the p-code of a binary.
The approach we take in this thesis has very computationally complex requirements.
Some optimizations have been made in order to compensate for harder to solve constraints.
For example, we do not consider paths that would visit an already visited node. This allows
us to avoid path explosion but also doesn’t accurately represent the compiled code. In the
future, solving constraints of a looping condition and then producing the correct number of
paths would be the most ideal solution.
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Testing and Results
This section contains testing data for the outlined approaches in the methodology sec-
tion of this thesis. The results are derived from the usage of the Ghidra Reverse Engineering
Framework[13] and the ideas outlined in the Methodology section to extract the size of an
input parameter to a function without directly emulating it. The test corpus consisted of
several functions for copying structures of varying size. Additionally, each function had
the decompiler’s assumed parameters accepted.
The Results for size analysis subsection has a table with the inference code ran to
try and assume the size of input parameters for the functions listed within the table. The
functions prepended with copy are simple copy functions where one result is copied to
another argument. The multi functions have supplied source code, but are intended to
generate multiple code blocks.
The Results for type correlation section discusses the results of the idea discussed in
the Semantic Type Correlation section. Functions prepended with analyze are functions
that accept different structures. Each structure has a shared member. In some instances
the code can detect when it has been used as a pointer, but at the moment is not detecting
pointer to pointer types.
The table at 6.2 shows test results for the same size inference test ran on 6.1. The table
at 6.3 shows a table of type masks for the inferred structure and where the code believes
the subtype belongs within the inferred structure.
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6.1 Results for Size Inference
Table 6.1: Results for size analysis
Results of Function Inference
Function Name Structure Size Inferred Size Correct
copy single int 4 4 Yes
copy two ints 8 8 Yes
copy single two int structs 12 12 Yes
copy several ptr structs int 8 8 Yes
copy single double 4 8 No
copy two doubles 12 16 No
copy single two double structs 24 20 No
copy several ptr structs double 8 8 Yes
multi block usage int 8 8 Yes
multi block usage double 16 12 No
6.2 Resources for Result Interpretation of Size Inference
Listing 6.1: Supplemental header for size analysis
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48 void copy_single_int(single_int* src, single_int* dst);
49 void copy_two_ints(two_ints* src, two_ints* dst);
50 void copy_single_two_int_structs(two_structs_int* src,\
51 two_structs_int* dst);
52 void copy_several_ptr_structs_int(several_ptrs_int* src,\
53 several_ptrs_int* dst);
54
55 void copy_single_double(single_double* src, single_double* dst);
56 void copy_two_doubles(two_doubles* src, two_doubles* dst);
57 void copy_single_two_double_structs(two_structs_double* src, \
58 two_structs_double* dst);
59 void copy_several_ptr_structs_double(several_ptrs_double* src,\
60 several_ptrs_double* dst);
61
62 void multi_block_usage_int(two_ints *foo);
63 void multi_block_usage_double(two_doubles *foo);
64
65 void multi_block_usage_int(two_ints *foo)
66 {
67 if(foo->first < 50)
68 {
69 foo->first += 50;
70 if(foo->second > 50)
71 {
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76 foo->first -= 50;
77 if(foo->second > 50)
78 {





84 void multi_block_usage_double(two_doubles *foo)
85 {
86 if(foo->first < 50)
87 {
88 foo->first += 50;
89 if(foo->second > 50)
90 {




95 foo->first -= 50;
96 if(foo->second > 50)
97 {




6.3 Results for Type Correlation
Table 6.2: Results for type correlation
Results of Argument Type Inference Size
Function Name Structure Size Inferred Size Correct
analyze two ints 8 8 Yes
analyze one struct member 12 12 Yes
analyze two struct member 12 12 Yes
analyze three struct member 16 16 Yes
analyze one struct member ptr 8 8 Yes
analyze two struct member ptr 8 8 Yes
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Table 6.3: Results for type masking
Results of Argument Type Inference Masking
Function Name Structure Size Structure Mask Correct
analyze two ints 8 11111111 Yes
analyze one struct member 12 111111110000 Yes
analyze two struct member 12 000011111111 Yes
analyze three struct member 16 0000000011111111 Yes
analyze one struct member ptr 8 11111111 No
analyze two struct member ptr 8 11111111 No
6.4 Resources for Type Correlation
Listing 6.2: Supplemental Type correlation header file





















22 // for testing the pointer variant












34 void analyze_two_ints(two_ints_struct* foo)
35 {
36 if(foo->first_member > 5)
37 {
38 printf("foo->first_member > 5\n");
39 }
40 if(foo->second_member < 5)
41 {




46 void analyze_one_struct_member(one_struct_member* foo)
47 {
48 analyze_two_ints(&(foo->first_member));
49 if(foo->second_member < 5)
50 {




55 void analyze_two_struct_member(two_struct_member* foo)
56 {
57 if(foo->first_member > 10)
58 {





64 void analyze_three_struct_member(three_struct_member* foo)
65 {
66 if(foo->first_member > 10)
67 {
68 printf("foo->first_member > 10\n");
69 }
70 if(foo->second_member < 5)
71 {





77 void analyze_one_struct_member_ptr(one_struct_member_ptr* foo)
78 {





83 if(foo->second_member < 5)
84 {




89 void analyze_two_struct_member_ptr(two_struct_member_ptr* foo)
90 {
91 if(foo->first_member > 10)
92 {
93 printf("foo->first_member > 10\n");
94 }







This methodology is effective at capturing the semantics provided to it without program
emulation. Encoding program behavior for target architecture can effectively capture data
that is interesting to reverse engineers and reduce the amount of noise required to under-
stand a set of problems. When beginning to understand how a system works you may only
have a goal in mind.
Reducing the amount of comprehension required to solve whatever challenge you face
is optimal for nearly any field of research or task at hand. The approach outlined in this
thesis can effectively encode trivial knowledge that can be automated with little work. This
automation would reduce overhead work and allow people tasked with understanding how
a binary operates to focus on harder challenges than get tasked with something that is
trivially apparent to observers.
The work necessary to encode new semantics in this system could be non-trivial. For
example, better associating structures between function calls and determining which (esti-
mated) types belong to which functions are a difficult problem. This could eventually be
solved by inferring types of members for each structure through usage within the binary.
While this thesis explores a very trivial example of this idea, there are limitations imposed
on the tool (correctly determining all functions within a binary) and tracking several layers
of pointer data types.
Sometimes you cannot count on instrumentation of code to produce results that are
helpful. Utilizing this approach allows for the binary to be analyzed without the need for
actually executing the underlying binary. This can be helpful for understanding malicious
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executables and for inexpensive research for hardware you do not own.
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